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Transcribed Speech of Joan Polacheck
MS. POLACHECK: I was very glad to hear this morning in Dr.
Brennan's talk that maybe the fraud and abuse laws do not really cause a lot
of barriers to what health care providers want to accomplish, but I've got to
say, I certainly spend a lot of sleepless nights - and I have a feeling a lot of
you out here do as well - worrying about whether my clients that I've given
what I think is very reasonable and maybe conservative advice to are going
to be the ones that get caught and meshed in some zealous prosecutor's web
in deciding that whatever they did was evil. [U]sually, those evils that the
fraud and abuse laws are aimed at are very related to our overall topic here
of provider responses to cost containment. [C]ertainly, this is nothing new.
Back when there was cost-based reimbursement, as I remember it, there
were a lot of creative ways to gain the system back because there was no
cost containment. There was just a lot of creativity out there. Obviously,
now we have more of a fixed pie with more perspective payment and
therefore, the fraud and abuse laws are more aimed at everybody trying to
either increase the pie artificially or increase their slice of the pie in some
manner that is contrary to the best interest of patients or the best interest of
the federal health care programs.
Of course, the counter- ailing concerns are that the fraud and abuse laws
raise barriers to more creative and cost effective quality-oriented dividing of
the health care reimbursement pie. I know John Blum's slides this morning
showed the cost benefit analysis and how maybe the cost of regulations is
more than the benefits. On the fraud and abuse side, however, I have not
seen a lot of data on that; but certainly, if you look at the government's
data, they are always touting, [for example, that they] got $1.5 billion last
year from health care providers and [that they] saved the world and made
the world a better place for the taxpayers and the patients. [I]f you look at
the fiscal year 2004 Department of Justice OIG Health Care Fraud and
Abuse Control Program report, again, it describes, starting with the highest
dollar numbers and down the road, how much money they have recovered
from various health care providers based on fraud and abuse issues.
I am going to [quickly] go through which fraud and abuse laws we are
talking about, because this is an audience that already is obviously familiar
with all of these issues. Obviously, the Anti-Kickback Law addresses
payments between referral sources, [for example], between doctors and
hospitals, [and between] people who want business and people who are in a
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position to give business that would increase patient volume, or cause
someone to choose one provider or another, or cherry pick. [T]hose are the
three big factors that I will get to in the case study that I am going to
discuss, to get through this tension between health care fraud and quality,
xxhich is the gainsharing area.
Stark Law addresses a lot of the same issue as the Anti-Kickback Law,
but puts that emphasis on the services deemed to be most vulnerable to
over-utilization or other abusive practices. [O]f course, the problem with
the Stark Law is that it is completely black and white. With the AntiKickback Lax, you look at intent, you look at facts and circumstances, you
do not have to be in a safe harbor, and you can feel much more comfortable
being creative. I, personally, feel very uncomfortable whenever I am
dealing with the Stark Law - don't worry clients. But you cannot act as
smart with the Stark Law. It does not matter if you have a good reason for
making a payment, it does not matter if you have all the facts and you
wveigh those facts on [both sides]. [I]t is black and white. If the payment
doesn't fit into one of the pigeonholed exceptions, then you are out of the
box.
The next two of the "Big Four" health care fraud and abuse laws are the
False Claims LaN\ and the Civil Monetary Penalties Laws. [Regarding] the
False Claims LaN , I think just submitting false claims is not that big a deal
in terms of some of these bigger issues. But I think the issue with the False
Claims Law is that every violation of every law - in particular, the AntiKickback Law and the Stark Law these days - is reconstructed as a False
Claims Law violation, so that you can get into the qui tam statute and have
whistleblowers bringing these actions. [T]he Civil Monetary Penalties law
addresses incentives to withhold or reduce care. [O]f course, the problem
with the CMP law is that the incentive-to-reduce-care piece of it is not an
incentive to reduce care - medically necessary care - but basically any care
regardless of whether it's medically necessary or focused on a particular
patient.
[W]hat provider responses to cost containment would implicate these
lax\s? [A]re these laws an effective means to ensure quality despite cost
containment? [D]o these laws impede cost quality initiatives, or are they
really necessary because people are going to do bad things? [W]hen a
provider is faced with reduced cost, is the provider going to say, "Well, let
me think of a good way to reduce my cost while maintaining quality and
maintaining access and all of that," or do we not trust the providers and are
they going to just do these bad things, [like] have bad referral incentives,
over-utilization, [and] overpayment?
[T]he classic case study of an area of the law where you see this tension
between being creative in this cost, quality, access area and the fraud and
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abuse laws is in gainsharing and the different responses we have seen,
particularly recently, to gainsharing initiatives. As most of you probably
know, there \\cre a number of advisory opinions earlier this year on
gainsharing. I think there were six of them that made people think, "Oh,
now the government is loosening up on gainsharing and maybe gainsharing
will be more of a possibility." In other words, [more of a possibility of]
sharing cost savings, like hospitals sharing cost savings with physicians.
But if you look at those opinions, they are extremely narrow. I cannot even
imagine how much it must have cost the people who got those opinions to
get them and to pay the consultants to do all the analysis it took to
determine how they would pay physicians to save money and yet guarantee,
in a way that made the OIG happy. that there would not be anything bad
happening. [S]o, the question really is: Are these practical solutions, or is
this really the same old, same old, that we've still got pretty much an
effective ban on gainsharing? And the [question] raised by the gainsharing
issue is: Do physicians ha\e to be paid to practice in a manner that balances
cost and quality, or should they be paid because they have to work and they
have to do a lot of things": In particular, primary care physicians are
underpaid, so if they are going to be asked to jump through a lot of hoops to
obtain cost savings and qualit\. why wouldn't they be paid?
[T]o get to some of the different positions on gainsharing, where it is
legally, and why it really brings that tension between fraud and abuse laws
and cost containment quality to a head, I think it is useful to look at the
statement submitted in connection with the October 7th hearings on
gainsharing that were held by the Ways and Means Subcommittee on
Health. I went on the website and started looking at the different statements
on there, and I thought, "These are really nice, juicy statements." If I were
more clever, I would have put up the quotes, and then at the end I would
have matched them up. But as they are, these statements are very
instructive and they just make you throw up your hands and think, "There is
no way we are ever going to solve this." There is no way we are going to
get to any [point] where wNe can have appropriate incentives for people to
share the pie in a way that doesn't expose those people sharing the pie to
fraud and abuse charges.
The first one is Pete Stark, who is subtle, of course, in his statements
here:
Bluntly stated, the discussion we're having today is about whether to turn
back time. Yet, the potential for abuse is the same today as it was in the
mid '80s, if not greater. Now, with cost reimbursement, it seems to me
there was more potential for abuse. But, now, as then, beneficiaries and
taxpayers are the ones who will suffer if these arrangements are
Frankly, Madam Chair, the underpinnings of today's
unleashed.
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discussion make me think that we may be paying hospitals too much. If
there are efficiencies to be gained - and I'm sure there are in some cases
-Medicare should be the one to reap the benefit.
Now, that's a very interesting statement because is he saying, "Well, if
hospitals have enough money to share with its agents, we must be paying
hospitals too much?" The whole idea behind respective payment was to
give hospitals the incentive to have that leftover margin, to reduce cost, and
to maintain quality, assuming there was some external way to maintain
quality. They're supposed to end up with something leftover, otherwise,
PPS isn't working very well. [Mr. Stark goes on to say:] "Instead, we're
here today to consider ways to foster inappropriate relationships to boost
physician income.
Such conflicted relationships are already far too
prevalent in our health system." So that's cheerful.
Lew Morris, the OIG Chief Counsel, is a little more professorial about it
and basically talks about the very same factors that you see listed in the
advisory opinions relating to gainsharing about what the OIG's concems
are and why the OIG makes providers jump through so many hoops in order
to do gainsharing. I won't read this all but it [deals with] cherry-picking
healthier patients, arrangements that allow for a physician to continue for an
extended period of time to reap the benefits. Basically, the kinds of things
that are all knocked down if you look at the actual advisory opinions, which
say things like, "You can only have your gainsharing program for one
year." So those kinds of things really make an effective gainsharing
[program] and an effective long-term partnership of saving costs very
difficult.
[T]his [next excerpt] is from Joanne Goodroe. She is the consultant
whose company worked on the various gainsharing arrangements that were
proved by the OIG. [S]he says, "Gainsharing is simply physicians assuring
that patients have access to all needed technology in order to deliver the
best quality care while eliminating waste in the system. It's basically the
cure for everything." [I]nterestingly, she is [referring to] cost, quality,
access, which were the three factors that were raised earlier, hitting the right
tone here in saying that [gainsharing] is the cure for everything that ails our
health care system.
But then we go back to the other side again. I thought this was
interesting because this person, Martin Emerson, CEO of American
Medical Systems, is representing AdvaMed, which is a trade association for
large device companies. He is taking a negative view of gainsharing, as I
suppose many device companies with cutting-edge devices would, saying,
"Under a gainsharing program, the balance between patient care and costcutting will be skewed.
Patient access to the best care could be
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol15/iss2/14
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compromised and virtually insurmountable hurdles for adoption of
beneficial new technologies could be created."
So he is worried that if they have a great new invention that is very
expensive, hospitals are very, very reluctant, obviously, to invest in that
new technology because there is no payment for it. [I]n particular, the one
thing that makes the hospitals sometimes invest in that expensive new
technology is that the physicians push them to do it. Now, if the physicians
are getting paid to save money, [then] maybe you won't have the physicians
pushing them to do that anymore.
On the other hand, I have a client who thought gainsharing would help
them. They thought it would help them do joint ventures with physicians
without as many problems. I had to tell them, unfortunately, that was not
going to help them any. But a lot of technology companies are doing joint
ventures, like equipment joint ventures with physicians and then leasing the
equipment to a hospital, and some of those things do lend themselves to
gainsharing arrangements. But it is true that most new technology makers
are going to be very wary.
The next [excerpt goes] back to the AHA - I don't know where I got it the AHA is working on a report, there's a task force doing a report on
gainsharing, and I have a copy, and I couldn't figure out where I got it. It
just suddenly was in my folder on the October 21st draft of a task force
report and it is very similar to Stuart Fine's testimony that is really a
systematic discussion by the AHA of what the AHA would like to see in
approved gainsharing. I think one problem with the AHA's proposed
argument is that it is compelling but it's not detailed enough. He says:
Currently, federal laws are focused on prohibiting or limiting interactions
between hospitals and physicians that might have monetary value to
either party. While the intent is honorable to avoid conflicts of interest,
the effect is to impede the ability of hospitals and physicians to work
together using incentives to improve quality, patient safety, and
community access to services. The current federal focus on sharing cost
savings gives rise to a fear among beneficiaries and consumers that such
efficiency-only incentives would result in things like curtailed care and
slower adoption of nexk technologies and treatments. We believe
Congress should modernize the current concept of gainsharing and focus
on the broader goal of fostering hospital-physician arrangements that
provide incentives for care improvement.
It is important to [note]
actually improving quality
and I feel bad because I'm
[statement indicates that],
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enough, let's make sure you still can't have specialty hospitals with
physician investment, because it says, "At the same time, we also urge that
Congress not view action in this area to be a substitute for a permanent ban
on the use of the whole hospital exception under the Ethics in Patient Care
Referrals Act by physician-owned limited-service hospitals." I thought it
was a little amusing that it had to be stuck in there at the end, in front of
Congress.
The next one is interesting. It's the CEO of American Association of
People With Disabilities. The concern here, of course, is that in a
gainsharing arrangement, a physician is going to make sure, as much as
possible, that any patient of that physician who has some kind of chronic
condition or disability isn't the one that goes through the system where the
physician is being measured based on cost. So, obviously, whatever system
would be adopted would have to address the issue that you can't save cost
just by denying access to the disabled.
[T]hen, finally, this [one] is the physician response and I think this piece
was very interesting because this Jeffrey Rich, Chairman of the Society For
Thoracic Surgery Task Force on Pay For Performance and Chair of the
Board of Directors of the Virginia Cardiac Surgery Quality Initiative, goes
on about how this particular group has been working on these issues for a
long time. It was very impressive that the physicians have put a lot of
energy into this issue. I have to apologize to this person for taking the last
paragraph out of context somewhat, but [it says]:
In conclusion, the STS and its regional collaborations such as the VCSQI
have been involved in QI for the past 15 years. These improvements
have occurred in an era of declining reimbursements and without
incentive payments primarily because we feel this is our professional
responsibility. I personally feel that the greatest privilege society has
given us, as physicians, is the ability to care for patients. But on behalf
of all physicians, as perhaps the primary drivers of quality improvement,
and hence health care savings, I must ask a central question about
gainsharing. Why should physicians, who drive much of the gain, be the
only group excluded from the sharing?
Now, I can see somebody from the OIG's Office or the Department of
Justice saying, "See, they are saying we want a piece of this pie, we want a
piece of the technical portion, not because we worked to create the savings,
but we're the ones that referred to that technical portion, we are the ones
that enabled the hospital to earn that technical portion, [and] we want our
share." So I think something like this definitely can be taken out of context
and, again, illustrates this big tension, to which I don't have any answer,
between the fraud and abuse laws, which keep us up at night, and the thing
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol15/iss2/14
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we all have to do, w\hich is moxe toNyard trying to [implement] initiatives
that lower cost and maintain quality and access.
I just have one more slide on just another set of issues that I don't have
time to get to, but it is a set of issues I've dealt with a lot that, again, raises
tension between cost sax ings in a NN
ay that I think is appropriate and the
fraud and abuse laws. NNhich is just pricing issues. I think the discount safe
harbor under the Anti-Kickback Laxx was drafted in a cost reimbursement
era and has imbedded in it a lot of suspicion around creative pricing
arrangements Linder the assumption that creative pricing means that what
really is being done here is that the buyer and seller are trying to gain the
system and get more money out of Medicare, where really under PPS, a lot
of these creative pricing mechanisms are simply trying to get to a win-win
situation where both the buyer and the seller can get to a point where
they're comfortable. [O]f course, hospitals under PPS don't want to buy a
big piece of capital equipment because they are only going to get paid for it
if they use it. So a lot of manufacturers these days, of course, are putting
together bundled pricing arrangements where there's no separate payment
for the capital equipment - it's not really free, but it's not separately paid
for - and the payment is made on a per-click or per-service or per-case basis
or is actual payment for the disposables, whereas the hospital buys a
package of the disposables and uses the equipment, the payment is made.
There's still a lot of uncertainty about those arrangements under the fraud
and abuse laws and if you read some of the government briefs in the Ross
Abbott settlement, it's xery scary to those of us who give advice in this
area. I think this is another area where definitely some loosening up by the
government is needed so x\e can have more creative pricing in the PPS area.
Thanks very much.
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